We obtain some dramatic results using statistical mechanics{ther-modynamics kinds of arguments concerning randomness, chaos, unpredictability, and uncertainty in mathematics. We construct an equation involving only whole numbers and addition, multiplication, and exponentiation, with the property that if one varies a parameter and asks whether the number of solutions is nite or in nite, the answer to this question is indistinguishable from the result of independent tosses of a fair coin. This yields a number of powerful G odel incompleteness-type results concerning the limitations of the axiomatic method, in which entropy{information measures are used.
Introduction
It is now half a century since Turing published his remarkable paper On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem (Turing 15] ). In that paper Turing constructs a universal Turing machine that can simulate any other Turing machine. He also uses Cantor's method to diagonalize over the countable set of computable real numbers and construct an uncomputable real, from which he deduces the unsolvability of the halting problem and as a corollary a form of G odel's incompleteness theorem. This paper has penetrated into our thinking to such a point that it is now regarded as obvious, a fate which is su ered by only the most basic conceptual contributions. Speaking as a mathematician, I cannot help noting with pride that the idea of a general purpose electronic digital computer was invented in order to cast light on a fundamental question regarding the foundations of mathematics, years before such objects were actually constructed. Of course, this is an enormous simpli cation of the complex genesis of the computer, to which many contributed, but there is as much truth in this remark as there is in many other historical \facts."
In another paper 5], I used ideas from algorithmic information theory to construct a diophantine equation whose solutions are in a sense random. In the present paper I shall try to give a relatively self-contained exposition of this result via another route, starting from Turing's original construction of an uncomputable real number.
Following Turing, consider an enumeration r 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; : : : of all computable real numbers between zero and one. We may suppose that r k is the real number, if any, computed by the kth computer program. Let Now change each of these digits, avoiding the digits zero and nine. The result is an uncomputable real number, because its rst digit is di erent from the rst digit of the rst computable real, its second digit is di erent from the second digit of the second computable real, etc. It is necessary to avoid zero and nine, because real numbers with di erent digit sequences can be equal to each other if one of them ends with an in nite sequence of zeros and the other ends with an in nite sequence of nines, for example, .3999999: : : = .4000000: : :
Having constructed an uncomputable real number by diagonalizing over the computable reals, Turing points out that it follows that the halting problem is unsolvable. In particular, there can be no way of deciding if the kth computer program ever outputs a kth digit. Because if there were, one could actually calculate the successive digits of the uncomputable real number de ned above, which is impossible. Turing also notes that a version of G odel's incompleteness theorem is an immediate corollary, because if there cannot be an algorithm for deciding if the kth computer program ever outputs a kth digit, there also cannot be a formal axiomatic system which would always enable one to prove which of these possibilities is the case, for in principle one could run through all possible proofs to decide. Using the powerful techniques which were developed in order to solve Hilbert's tenth problem (see Davis et al. 7] and Jones and Matijasevi c 11]), it is possible to encode the unsolvability of the halting problem as a statement about an exponential diophantine equation. An exponential diophantine equation is one of the form P(x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) = P 0 (x 1 ; : : : ; x m ); where the variables x 1 ; : : : ; x m range over natural numbers and P and P 0 are functions built up from these variables and natural number constants by the operations of addition, multiplication, and exponentiation. The result of this encoding is an exponential diophantine equation P = P 0 in m + 1 variables n; x 1 ; : : :; x m with the property that P(n; x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) = P 0 (n; x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) has a solution in natural numbers x 1 ; : : : ; x m if and only if the nth computer program ever outputs an nth digit. It follows that there can be no algorithm for deciding as a function of n whether or not P = P 0 has a solution, and thus there cannot be any complete proof system for settling such questions either. Up to now we have followed Turing's original approach, but now we will set o into new territory. Our point of departure is a remark of Courant and Robbins 6] that another way of obtaining a real number that is not on the list r 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; : : : is by tossing a coin. Here is their measure-theoretic argument that the real numbers are uncountable. Recall that r 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; : : : are the computable reals between zero and one. Cover r 1 with an interval of length =2, cover r 2 with an interval of length =4, cover r 3 with an interval of length =8, and in general cover r k with an interval of length =2 k . Thus all computable reals in the unit interval are covered by this in nite set of intervals, and the total length of the covering intervals is 1 X k=1 2 k = : Hence if we take su ciently small, the total length of the covering is arbitrarily small. In summary, the reals between zero and one constitute an interval of length one, and the subset that are computable can be covered by intervals whose total length is arbitrarily small. In other words, the computable reals are a set of measure zero, and if we choose a real in the unit interval at random, the probability that it is computable is zero. Thus one way to get an uncomputable real with probability one is to ip a fair coin, using independent tosses to obtain each bit of the binary expansion of its base-two representation.
If this train of thought is pursued, it leads one to the notion of a random real number, which can never be a computable real. Following Martin-L of 12], we give a de nition of a random real using constructive measure theory. We say that a set of real numbers X is a constructive measure zero set if there is an algorithm A which given n generates a (possibly in nite) set of intervals whose total length is less than or equal to 2 ?n and which covers the set X. More precisely, the covering is in the form of a set C of nite binary strings s such that X s2C 2 ?jsj 2 ?n (here jsj denotes the length of the string s), and each real in the covered set X has a member of C as the initial part of its base-two expansion.
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In other words, we consider sets of real numbers with the property that there is an algorithm A for producing arbitrarily small coverings of the set. Such sets of reals are constructively of measure zero. Since there are only countably many algorithms A for constructively covering measure zero sets, it follows that almost all real numbers are not contained in any set of constructive measure zero. Such reals are called (Martin-L of) random reals. In fact, if the successive bits of a real number are chosen by coin ipping, with probability one it will not be contained in any set of constructive measure zero, and hence will be a random real number.
Note that no computable real number r is random. Here is how we get a constructive covering of arbitrarily small measure. The covering algorithm, given n, yields the n-bit initial sequence of the binary digits of r. This covers r and has total length or measure equal to 2 ?n . Thus there is an algorithm for obtaining arbitrarily small coverings of the set consisting of the computable real r, and r is not a random real number. We leave to the reader the adaptation of the argument in Feller 9] proving the strong law of large numbers to show that reals in which all digits do not have equal limiting frequency have constructive measure zero. It follows that random reals are normal in Borel's sense, that is, in any base all digits have equal limiting frequency.
Let us consider the real number p whose nth bit in base-two notation is a zero or a one depending on whether or not the exponential diophantine equation P(n; x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) = P 0 (n; x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) has a solution in natural numbers x 1 ; : : :; x m . We will show that p is not a random real. In fact, we will give an algorithm for producing coverings of measure (n + 1)2 ?n , which can obviously be changed to one for producing coverings of measure not greater than 2 ?n . Consider the rst N values of the parameter n. If one knows for how many of these values of n, P = P 0 has a solution, then one can nd for which values of n < N there are solutions. This is because the set of solutions of P = P 0 is recursively enumerable, that is, one can try more and more solutions and eventually nd each value of the parameter n for which there is a solution. The only problem is to decide when to give up further searches because all values of n < N for which there are solutions have been found. But if one is told how many such n there are, then one knows when to stop searching for solutions. So one can assume each of the N +1 possibilities ranging from p has all of its initial N bits o to p has all of them on, and each one of these assumptions determines the actual values of the rst N bits of p. Thus we have determined N + 1 di erent possibilities for the rst N bits of p, that is, the real number p is covered by a set of intervals of total length (N + 1)2 ?N , and hence is a set of constructive measure zero, and p cannot be a random real number.
Thus asking whether an exponential diophantine equation has a solution as a function of a parameter cannot give us a random real number. However asking whether or not the number of solutions is in nite can give us a random real. In particular, there is a exponential diophantine equation Q = Q 0 such that the real number q is random whose nth bit is a zero or a one depending on whether or not there are in nitely many natural numbers x 1 ; : : : ; x m such that Q(n; x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) = Q 0 (n; x 1 ; : : :; x m ):
The equation P = P 0 that we considered before encoded the halting problem, that is, the nth bit of the real number p was zero or one depending on whether the nth computer program ever outputs an nth digit. To construct an equation Q = Q 0 such that q is random is somewhat more di cult; we shall limit ourselves to giving an outline of the proof: 1 1. First show that if one had an oracle for solving the halting problem, then one could compute the successive bits of the base-two representation of a particular random real number q. 2. Then show that if a real number q can be computed using an oracle for the halting problem, it can be obtained without using an oracle as the limit of a computable sequence of dyadic rational numbers (rationals of the form K=2 L ). 3. Finally show that any real number q that is the limit of a computable sequence of dyadic rational numbers can be encoded into an exponential diophantine equation Q = Q 0 in such a manner that Q(n; x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) = Q 0 (n; x 1 ; : : :; x m ) has in nitely many solutions x 1 ; : : :; x m if and only if the nth bit of the real number q is a one. This is done using the fact \that every r.e. set has a singlefold exponential diophantine representation" (Jones and Matijasevi c 11]). Q = Q 0 is quite a remarkable equation, as it shows that there is a kind of uncertainty principle even in pure mathematics, in fact, even in the theory of whole numbers. Whether or not Q = Q 0 has in nitely many solutions jumps around in a completely unpredictable manner as the parameter n varies. It may be said that the truth or falsity of the assertion that there are in nitely many solutions is indistinguishable from the result of independent tosses of a fair coin. In other words, these are independent mathematical facts with probability one-half! This is where our search for a probabilistic proof of Turing's theorem that there are uncomputable real numbers has led us, to a dramatic version of G odel's incompleteness theorem.
In Section 2 we de ne the real number , and we develop as much of algorithmic information theory as we shall need in the rest of the paper. In Section 3 we compare a number of de nitions of randomness, we show that is random, and we show that can be encoded into an exponential diophantine equation. In Section 4 we develop incompleteness theorems for and for its exponential diophantine equation.
Algorithmic Information Theory 3]
First a piece of notation. By log x we mean the integer part of the base-two logarithm of x. That is, if 2 n x < 2 n+1 , then log x = n. Thus 2 log x x, even if x < 1. Our point of departure is the observation that the series X 1 n ; X 1 n log n ; X 1 n log n log log n all diverge. On the other hand, X 1 n 2 ; X 1 n(log n) 2 ; X 1 n log n(log log n) 2 all converge. To show this we use the Cauchy condensation test (Hardy 10] ): if (n) is a nonincreasing function of n, then the series P (n) is convergent or divergent according as P 2 n (2 n ) is convergent or divergent.
Here is a proof of the Cauchy condensation test
Thus P 1 n behaves the same as P 2 n 1 2 n = P 1, which diverges. P 1 n log n behaves the same as P 2 n 1 2 n n = P 1 n , which diverges. X 1 n log n log log n behaves the same as P 2 n 1 2 n n log n = P 1 n log n , which diverges, etc. On the other hand, P 1 n 2 behaves the same as P 2 n 1 2 2n = P 1 2 n , which converges. P 1 n(log n) 2 behaves the same as P 2 n 1 2 n n 2 = P 1 n 2 , which converges. X 1 n log n(log log n) 2 behaves the same as P 2 n 1 2 n n(logn) 2 = P 1 n(log n) 2 , which converges, etc. For the purposes of this paper, it is best to think of the algorithmic information content H, which we shall now de ne, as the borderline between P 2 ?f(n) converging and diverging! De nition. De ne an information content measure H(n) to be a function of the natural number n having the property that X 2 ?H(n) 1;
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and that H(n) is computable as a limit from above, so that the set f\H(n) k"g (2) of all upper bounds is r.e. We also allow H(n) = +1, which contributes zero to the sum (1) since 2 ?1 = 0. It contributes no elements to the set of upper bounds (2).
Note. If H is an information content measure, then it follows
That is, there are at most 2 n natural numbers with information content less than or equal to n. 
where H k denotes the information content measure resulting from taking the kth (k 1) computer algorithm and patching it, if necessary, so that it gives limits from above and does not violate the 1 condition (1). Then (3) gives H as a computable limit from above, and
Q.E.D.
De nition. Henceforth we use this minimal information content measure H, and we refer to H(n) as the information content of n. We also consider each natural number n to correspond to a bit string s and 
If f(n) is computable and P 2 ?f(n) diverges, then H(n) f(n) in nitely often. Let us look at a real-valued function (n) that is computable as a limit of rationals from below. And suppose that P (n) 1. Then H(n) ? log (n) + O(1). So 2 ?H(n) can be thought of as a maximal function (n) that is computable in the limit from below and has
The lemma follows by the minimality of H. Q.E.D.
Lemma I3. There are < 2 n?k+c n-bit strings s such that H(s) < n + H(n) ? k. Thus there are < 2 n?H(n)?k+c n-bit strings s such that H(s) < n ? k. On the other hand, consider (n) = hn; ni. By Lemma I4,
On the other hand, consider (n) = hn; 0i. By Lemma I4, Note. The further development of this algorithmic version of information theory 3 requires the notion of the size in bits of a self-delimiting computer program (Chaitin 3]) , which, however, we can do without in this paper.
Random Reals De nition (Martin-L of 12]). Speaking geometrically, a real r is
Martin-L of random if it is never the case that it is contained in each set of an r.e. in nite sequence A i of sets of intervals with the property that the measure 4 of the ith set is always less than or equal to 2 ?i ,
Here is the de nition of a Martin-L of random real r in a more compact notation:
An equivalent de nition, if we restrict ourselves to reals in the unit interval 0 r 1, may be formulated in terms of bit strings rather than geometrical notions, as follows. De ne a covering to be an r.e. set of ordered pairs consisting of a natural number i and a bit string s, Covering = fhi; sig; with the property that if hi; si 2 Covering and hi; s 0 i 2 Covering, then it is not the case that s is an extension of s 0 or that s 0 is an extension 15 of s. 5 We simultaneously consider A i to be a set of ( nite) bit strings fsjhi; si 2 Coveringg and to be a set of real numbers, namely those which in base-two notation have a bit string in A i as an initial segment. 6 Then condition (5) becomes (A i ) = X hi;si2Covering 2 ?jsj 2 ?i ; (6) where jsj = the length in bits of the string s.
Note. This is equivalent to stipulating the existence of an arbitrary \regulator of convergence" f ! 1 that is computable and nondecreasing such that (A i ) 2 ?f(i) . A 0 is only required to have measure 1 and is sort of useless, since we are working within the unit interval 0 r 1. 7 Any real number, considered as a singleton set, is a set of measure zero, but not constructively so! Similarly, the notion of a von Mises' collective, 8 which is an in nite bit string such that any place selection rule based on the preceding bits picks out a substring with the same limiting frequency of 0's and 1's as the whole string has, is contradictory. But Alonzo Church's idea, to allow only computable place selection rules, saves the concept. 5 This is to avoid overlapping intervals and enable us to use the formula (6) . It is easy to convert a covering which does not have this property into one that covers exactly the same set and does have this property. How this is done depends on the order in which overlaps are discovered: intervals which are subsets of ones which have already been included in the enumeration of A i are eliminated, and intervals which are supersets of ones which have already been included in the enumeration must be split into disjoint subintervals, and the common portion must be thrown away. 6 I.e., the geometrical statement that a point is covered by (the union of) a set of intervals, corresponds in bit string language to the statement that an initial segment of an in nite bit string is contained in a set of nite bit strings. The fact that some reals correspond to two in nite bit strings, e.g., .100000... = .011111..., causes no problems. We are working with closed intervals, which include their endpoints. De nition (Solovay 14] A real r is strongly Chaitin random if (the information content of the initial segment r n of length n of the base-two expansion of r) eventually 9 Thus n ? c H(r n ) n + H(n) + c 0 n + logn + 2 loglog n + c 00 by Lemmas I2 and I. becomes and remains arbitrarily greater than n: lim inf H(r n )?n = 1.
In other words, 8k9N k 8(n N k ) H(r n ) n + k] : Note. All these de nitions hold with probability one (see Theorem R4 It follows from the minimality of H that s 2 A n 2 and n N ) H(s) jsj ? n + c: Thus, since r 2 A n 2 for all n N, there will be in nitely many initial segments r k of length k of the base-two expansion of r with the property that r k 2 A n 2 and n N, and for each of these r k we have H(r k ) jr k j ? n + c:
Thus the information content of an initial segment of the base-two expansion of r can drop arbitrarily far below its length. i.e., if a bit string s is in A i and i N, then its information content is less than or equal to its size in bits +c. Thus H(r n ) jr n j+c = n+c for in nitely many initial segments r n of length n of the base-two expansion of r, and it is not the case that H(r n ) ? n ! 1. Proof. :(strong Chaitin) ) :Solovay. :(strong Chaitin) says that there is a k such that for in nitely many values of n we have H(r n ) ? n < k. The probability that an n-bit string s has H(s) < n + k is < 2 ?H(n)+k+c (Lemma I3) . Let A n be the r.e. set of all n-bit strings s such that H(s) < n + k. X (A n ) X and the probability is zero that a real r is in in nitely many of the A i .
But there are only countably many choices for the r.e. sequence of A i , since there are only countably many algorithms. Since the union of a countable number of sets of measure zero is also of measure zero, it follows that with probability one r is Solovay random. Proof 2. We use the Borel{Cantelli lemma again. This time we show that the strong Chaitin criterion for randomness, which is equivalent to the Solovay criterion, is true with probability one. Since for each k, X n PrfH(r n ) < n + kg 2 k+c and thus converges, 13 it follows that for each k with probability one H(r n ) < n + k only nitely often. Thus, with probability one, lim n!1 H(r n ) ? n = 1: is a Martin-L of{Chaitin{weak Solovay random real.
14 Proof. Since H(n) can be computed as a limit from above, 2 ?H(n) can be computed as a limit from below. It follows that given k , the rst k bits of the base-two expansion without in nitely many consecutive trailing zeros 15 of the real number , one can calculate the nite set of all n 2 N such that H(n) k, and then, since N is in nite, one can calculate an n 2 N with H(n) > k. That is, there is a computable partial function such that ( k ) = a natural number n with H(n) > k: Proof. Since H(n) can be computed as a limit from above, 2 ?H(n) can be computed as a limit from below. It follows that = X 2 ?H(n) is the limit from below of a computable sequence ! 1 ! 2 ! 3 of rational numbers = lim k!1 ! k : This sequence converges extremely slowly! The exponential diophantine equation L = R is constructed from the sequence ! k by using the theorem that \every r.e. relation has a singlefold exponential diophantine representation" (Jones and Matijasevi c 11]). Since the assertion that \the nth bit of ! k is a 1" is an r.e. relation between n and k (in fact, it is a recursive relation), the theorem of Jones and Matijasevi c yields an equation L(n; k; x 2 ; : : :; x m ) = R(n; k; 
Incompleteness Theorems
Having developed the necessary information-theoretic formalism in Section 2, and having studied the notion of a random real in Section 3, we can now begin to derive incompleteness theorems.
The setup is as follows. The axioms of a formal theory are considered to be encoded as a single nite bit string, the rules of inference are considered to be an algorithm for enumerating the theorems given the axioms, and in general we shall x the rules of inference and vary the axioms. More formally, the rules of inference F may be considered to be an r.e. set of propositions of the form \Axioms`F Theorem." The r.e. set of theorems deduced from the axiom A is determined by selecting from the set F the theorems in those propositions which have the axiom A as an antecedent. In general we will consider the rules of inference F to be xed and study what happens as we vary the axioms A. By an n-bit theory we shall mean the set of theorems deduced from an n-bit axiom.
Incompleteness Theorems for Lower Bounds on Information Content
Let us start by rederiving within our current formalism an old and very basic result, which states that even though most strings are random, one can never prove that a speci c string has this property.
G. J. Chaitin
If one produces a bit string s by tossing a coin n times, 99.9% of the time it will be the case that H(s) n + H(n) (Lemmas I2 and I3) . In fact, if one lets n go to in nity, with probability one H(s) > n for all but nitely many n (Theorem R4). However, Theorem LB (Chaitin 1,2,4] ). Consider a formal theory all of whose theorems are assumed to be true. Within such a formal theory a speci c string cannot be proven to have information content more than O(1) greater than the information content of the axioms of the theory. That is, if \H(s) n" is a theorem only if it is true, then it is a theorem only if n H(axioms) + O(1). Conversely, there are formal theories whose axioms have information content n + O(1) in which it is possible to establish all true propositions of the form \H(s) n" and of the form \H(s) = k" with k < n.
Proof. Consider the enumeration of the theorems of the formal axiomatic theory in order of the size of their proofs. For each natural number k, let s be the string in the theorem of the form \H(s) n" with n > H(axioms) + k which appears rst in the enumeration. On the one hand, if all theorems are true, then H(axioms) + k < H(s ): On the other hand, the above prescription for calculating s shows that s = (hhaxioms; H(axioms)i; ki) ( partial recursive); and thus H(s ) H(hhaxioms; H(axioms)i; ki)+c H(axioms)+H(k)+O (1): Here we have used the subadditivity of information H(hs; ti) H(s) + H(t)+O(1) (Lemma I6) and the fact that H(hs; H(s)i) H(s)+O(1) (Lemma I8) . It follows that H(axioms) + k < H(s ) H(axioms) + H(k) + O(1); and thus k < H(k) + O(1): However, this inequality is false for all k k 0 , where k 0 depends only on the rules of inference. A contradiction is avoided only if s does not exist for k = k 0 , i.e., it is impossible to prove in the formal theory that a speci c string has H greater than H(axioms) + k 0 .
Proof of Converse. The set T of all true propositions of the form \H(s) k" is r.e. Choose a xed enumeration of T without repetitions, and for each natural number n, let s be the string in the last proposition of the form \H(s) k" with k < n in the enumeration. Let 
by Lemmas I6 and I8. The rst line of (7) implies that n ? H(s ) H( ) + O(1); which implies that and H( ) are both bounded. Then the second line of (7) implies that H(hhs ; H(s )i; i) = n + O(1): The triple hhs ; H(s )i; i is the desired axiom: it has information content n + O(1), and by enumerating T until all true propositions of the form \H(s) k" with k < n have been discovered, one can immediately deduce all true propositions of the form \H(s) n" and of the form \H(s) = k" with k < n. Q.E.D.
Incompleteness Theorems for Random Reals: First Approach
In this section we begin our study of incompleteness theorems for random reals. We show that any particular formal theory can enable one to determine at most a nite number of bits of . In the following sections (4.3 and 4.4) we express the upper bound on the number of bits of which can be determined, in terms of the axioms of the theory; for now, we just show that an upper bound exists. We shall not use any ideas from algorithmic information theory until Section 4.4; for now (Sections 4.2 and 4.3) we only make use of the fact that is Martin-L of random.
If one tries to guess the bits of a random sequence, the average number of correct guesses before failing is exactly 1 guess! Reason: if we use the fact that the expected value of a sum is equal to the sum of the expected values, the answer is the sum of the chance of getting the rst guess right, plus the chance of getting the rst and the second guesses right, plus the chance of getting the rst, second and third guesses right, etc., Theorem X. Any given formal theory T can yield only nitely many (scattered) bits of (the base-two expansion of) .
When we say that a theory yields a bit of , we mean that it enables us to determine its position and its 0/1 value.
Proof. Consider a theory T, an r.e. set of true assertions of the form \The nth bit of is 0." \The nth bit of is 1."
Here n denotes speci c natural numbers. If T provides k di erent (scattered) bits of , then that gives us a covering A k of measure 2 ?k which includes : Enumerate T until k bits of are determined, then the covering is all bit strings up to the last determined bit with all determined bits okay. If n is the last determined bit, this covering will consist of 2 n?k n-bit strings, and will have measure 2 n?k =2 n = 2 ?k .
It follows that if T yields in nitely many di erent bits of , then for any k we can produce by running through all possible proofs in T a covering A k of measure 2 ?k which includes . But this contradicts the fact that is Martin-L of random. Hence T yields only nitely many bits of . Q.E.D.
Corollary X. Since by Theorem R7 can be encoded into an exponential diophantine equation L(n; x 1 ; : : :; x m ) = R(n; x 1 ; : : :; x m ); (8) it follows that any given formal theory can permit one to determine whether (8) has nitely or in nitely many solutions x 1 ; : : : ; x m , for only nitely many speci c values of the parameter n.
Incompleteness Theorems for Random Reals:
jAxiomsj Theorem A. If P 2 ?f(n) 1 and f is computable, then there is a constant c f with the property that no n-bit theory ever yields more than n + f(n) + c f bits of . Proof. Let A k be the event that there is at least one n such that there is an n-bit theory that yields n + f(n) + k or more bits of . More Detailed Proof. Assume the opposite of what we want to prove, namely that for every k there is at least one n-bit theory that yields n + f(n) + k bits of . From this we shall deduce that cannot be Martin-L of random, which is impossible.
To get a covering A k of with measure 2 ?k , consider a speci c n and all n-bit theories. Start generating theorems in each n-bit theory until it yields n+f(n)+k bits of (it does not matter if some of these bits are wrong). The measure of the set of possibilities for covered by the n-bit theories is thus 2 n 2 ?n?f(n)?k = 2 ?f(n)?k . The measure (A k ) of the union of the set of possibilities for covered by n-bit theories with any n is thus X
Thus is covered by A k and (A k ) 2 ?k for every k if there is always an n-bit theory that yields n + f(n) + k bits of , which is impossible. Q.E.D.
Corollary A. If P 2 ?f(n) converges and f is computable, then there is a constant c f with the property that no n-bit theory ever yields more than n + f(n) + c f bits of . Proof. Choose c so that P 2 ?f(n) 2 c . Then P 2 ? f(n)+c] 1, and we can apply Theorem A to f 0 (n) = f(n) + c. Q.E.D.
Corollary A2. Let P 2 ?f(n) converge and f be computable as before. If g(n) is computable, then there is a constant c f;g with the property that no g(n)-bit theory ever yields more than g(n)+f(n)+c f;g bits of . For example, consider N of the form 2 2 n . For such N, no N-bit theory ever yields more than N + f(log log N) + c f;g bits of .
Note. Thus for n of special form, i.e., which have concise descriptions, we get better upper bounds on the number of bits of which are yielded by n-bit theories. This is a foretaste of the way algorithmic information theory will be used in Theorem C and Corollary C2 (Sect. 4.4). Second Borel{Cantelli Lemma (Feller 9] ). Suppose that the events A n have the property that it is possible to determine whether or not the event A n occurs by examining the rst f(n) bits of , where f is a computable function. If the events A n are mutually independent and P PrfA n g diverges, then has the property that in nitely many of the A n must occur. Proof. Suppose on the contrary that has the property that only nitely many of the events A n occur. Then there is an N such that the event A n does not occur if n N. The probability that none of the events A N ; A N+1 ; : : :; A N+k occur is, since the A n are mutually independent, precisely
which goes to zero as k goes to in nity. This would give us arbitrarily small covers for , which contradicts the fact that is Martin-L of random. Q.E.D.
Theorem B. If P 2 n?f(n) diverges and f is computable, then innitely often there is a run of f(n) zeros between bits 2 n & 2 n+1 of (2 n bit < 2 n+1 ). Hence there are rules of inference which have the property that there are in nitely many N-bit theories that yield (the rst) N + f(log N) bits of . Proof. We wish to prove that in nitely often must have a run of k = f(n) consecutive zeros between its 2 n th & its 2 n+1 th bit position. There are 2 n bits in the range in question. Divide this into nonoverlapping blocks of 2k bits each, giving a total of 2 n =2k blocks. The chance of having a run of k consecutive zeros in each block of 2k bits is k2 k?2 2 2k :
Reason:
There are 2k ? k + 1 k di erent possible choices for where to put the run of k zeros in the block of 2k bits. Then there must be a 1 at each end of the run of 0's, but the remaining 2k ? k ? 2 = k ? 2 bits can be anything.
This may be an underestimate if the run of 0's is at the beginning or end of the 2k bits, and there is no room for endmarker 1's. There is no room for another 10 k 1 to t in the block of 2k bits, so we are not overestimating the probability by counting anything twice. Summing (9) over all 2 n =2k blocks and over all n, we get X Corollary B2. If P 2 ?f(n) diverges and f is computable, then in nitely often there is a run of n + f(n) zeros between bits 2 n & 2 n+1 of (2 n bit < 2 n+1 ). Hence there are in nitely many N-bit theories that yield (the rst) N + log N + f(log N) bits of . Proof. Take f(n) = n + f 0 (n) in Theorem B. Q.E.D.
Theorem AB. (a) There is a c with the property that no n-bit theory ever yields more than n + log n + 2 log log n + c (scattered) bits of .
(b) There are in nitely many n-bit theories that yield (the rst) n + log n + log log n bits of .
Proof. Using the Cauchy condensation test, we have seen (beginning of Sect. 2) that (a) X 1 n(log n) 2 converges and (b) X 1 n log n diverges. The theorem follows immediately from Corollaries A and B. Q.E.D.
Incompleteness Theorems for Random Reals: H(Axioms)
Theorem C is a remarkable extension of Theorem R6:
We have seen that the information content of knowing the rst n bits of ] is n ? c. Theorem C. If a theory has H(axiom) < n, then it can yield at most n + c (scattered) bits of . Proof. Consider a particular k and n. If there is an axiom with H(axiom) < n which yields n+k scattered bits of , then even without knowing which axiom it is, we can cover with an r.e. But by the preceding lemma, we see that X n #fsjH(s) < ng2 ?n?k = 2 ?k X n #fsjH(s) < ng2 ?n 2 ?k :
Thus if even one theory with H < n yields n+k bits of , for any n, we get a cover for of measure 2 ?k . This can only be true for nitely many values of k, or would not be Martin-L of random. Q.E.D.
Corollary C. No n-bit theory ever yields more than n + H(n) + c Then using Lemmas I and I4 we see that for all su ciently large values of n, H(g ?1 (n)) H(n) + O(1) O(log n) < n g(g ?1 (n)):
That is, H(k) < g(k) for all k = g ?1 (n) and n su ciently large. Q.E.D.
Corollary C2. Let g(n) be computable and unbounded. For innitely many n, no n-bit theory yields more than n + g(n) + c bits of .
(Proof: Corollary C and Lemma C2.)
Note. In appraising Corollaries C and C2, the trivial formal systems in which there is always an n-bit axiom that yields the rst n bits of should be kept in mind. Also, compare Corollaries C and A, and Corollaries C2 and A2. In summary, Theorem D. There is an exponential diophantine equation L(n; x 1 ; : : :; x m ) = R(n; x 1 ; : : :; x m ) (10) which has only nitely many solutions x 1 ; : : :; x m if the nth bit of is a 0, and which has in nitely many solutions x 1 ; : : :; x m if the nth bit of is a 1. Let us say that a formal theory \settles k cases" if it enables one to prove that the number of solutions of (10) is nite or that it is in nite for k speci c values (possibly scattered) of the parameter n. Let f(n) and g(n) be computable functions. P 2 ?f(n) < 1 ) all n-bit theories settle n+f(n)+O(1) cases. P 2 ?f(n) = 1 and f(n) f(n+1) ) for in nitely many n, there is an n-bit theory that settles n + f(n) cases.
H(theory) < n ) it settles n + O(1) cases. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have seen that proving whether particular exponential diophantine equations have nitely or in nitely many solutions, is absolutely intractable. Such questions escape the power of mathematical reasoning. This is a region in which mathematical truth has no discernible structure or pattern and appears to be completely random. These questions are completely beyond the power of human reasoning. Mathematics cannot deal with them.
Quantum physics has shown that there is randomness in nature. I believe that we have demonstrated in this paper that randomness is already present in pure mathematics. This does not mean that the universe and mathematics are lawless, it means that laws of a di erent kind apply: statistical laws.
